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AN INTRODUCTION TO
SOME INTERNATIONAL LAW CONCEPTS
JOHN

H.

CRABBt

I

International law is the system of norms of conduct that apply on
the community of states in their relations with one another.1 As
such, it is a distinct field of legal subject-matter, in the same manner as we speak of criminal law, property law, administrative law,
and the other generally recognized "fields" of law. But international law is distinct from all other fields of law in more fundamental ways than merely the description of its subject-matter. These
distinctions lie in the subjects upon whom it operates, and in the
concepts of sanctions or enforcement.
All law other than international law is designed as a system of
norms binding on private individuals (including, of course, nonnatural private individuals, such as corporations). To the extent
that such laws operate on the state as well, such as constitutional
limitations on behavior of the state, they are regulations of the relationships between the state and individuals. By contrast, international law concerns itself solely with states as its subjects upon
whom it confers its rights and obligations. 2 It is true that an individual's affairs may be vitally affected by principles of international
law, but only in his status as an object, rather than a subject of international law. For example, an individual while present in a foreign state may have been subjected to treatment by the foreign
state which was in violation of international law rules as to the
treatment of foreigners. If the foreign state refused to give redress,
or to allow itself to be sued in its own courts by this individual, his
avenue of redress would be to petition his own state to espouse his
claim. If his own state were willing to do so, and presented this
claim and it proved to be a valid one, the foreign state would become obligated, not to the individual himself, but to the individual's
Associate Professor of Law, University of North Dakota. As the title indicates, this
article is not designed for scholars in the field of international law. Rather, it is designed
to offer orientation on some basic international law concepts to those who are total strangers
to the field. Indeed, a scholar's main interest in this article might be to quarrel with dogmatic statements that are made without supporting argumentation or documentation. But,
however much criticism might be generated along such lines, the article will have served its
purpose if it directs the attention of those unfamiliar with international law to some concepts of most basic concern. It is an attempt to stimulate initial-thought and analysis along
lines that would provide a skeletal framework for a structuring of the subject.
1. Hackworth, 1 DIGEsT oF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (1940).
2. Schwarzenberger, 1 INTERNATIONAL LAW 142 (3d ed. 1957).
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state.3 So, international law, in securing justice for this individual,
would be operating only upon the two states involved, and he
would be securing his reparations indirectly when his own state
presumably would turn over to him the damages collected for his
losses.
It is'true that there has in recent decades been some quarrel with
this traditional proposition that international law does not apply to
individuals. 4 It has been contended that international law imposes
obligations directly upon individuals, and rules relating to, piracy
and the conduct of warfare have been urged as prime examples of
this. 5 And the Nuremburg Trials have been cited as a conclusive
example of the recognition by the international community of the
direct applicability of international law upon individuals as its subjects.' However this may be, it is intended here to do no more than
point out the existence of this controversy without attempting to
explore into it. The proponents of this novel view have not yet
carried the day, and for the initiate it simplifies analysis for him to
accept the traditional view of international law as being limited to
states.
All national (or "municipal") law is enforced or enforcible by the
state, acting through its official machinery. The state is the sovereign that makes these laws, and it has at its disposal the physical
means to apply whatever sanctions may be necessary to enforce
obedience to its laws. The sovereign ordains laws for its subjects
without benefit of having been imposed by any sovereign or agency
superior to the states themselves that are the subjects of the law.
The sovereign state is by definition the highest legal entity, and it
knows no superior. Hence, the sanctions of international law must
be those that equal subjects impose on each other. International
law is then further distinct for the lack of any enforcing agency
superior to the subjects of the law themselves.
This lack of customary sanctions in international law has lead
some thoughtful scholars to the conclusion that international law is
not "law" at all. They would recognize the existence of some phenomenon going by that name, but would characterize it as custom
or a moral code outside the scope of law.' This is because they consider that sanctions, in the sense that they are known in national
3. This example of international procedures is discussed in Fenwiek, INTERNATIONAL
LAW 279 (3d ed. 1948).
4. Jessup, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS 15 (1948).
5. Harvard Law School -RESEARCH
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 751-760 (1932).
6. See Von Knieriem, (tr. Schmitt), THE NUREMBURG TRIALS 28-35 (1959).
7. Austin states that international law "is law improperly so called." Austin, 1 JuN1sPRUDENCE § 199 (Campbell's Notes, 1874).
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law, are of the essence of law, and anything lacking this essence
cannot be law. 8 This is a facet of a broader jurisprudential controversy regarding the nature of all law.
In simplified terms, there are two basic schools of jurisprudential
thought, both with venerable lineage tracing back at least to the
ancient Greeks. These are most commonly referred to as the natural
law and the positivist schools. According to natural law theory, law
is an entity which exists independently and outside of human will
and creation. It is discovered and becomes known to us by the
operation of human intellectual processes. Law is what is just, and
what is just is discoverable by the human intellect and its rational
powers, although they do not create what is just. By analogy, the
scientist who discovers a hitherto unknown physical law had no
part in the creation of what he discovered. If this is the essence of
law, it can readily be seen how the question of sanctions would be
a matter of indifference to the existence of law; whether or not a
law is physically enforced or obeyed would be a separate inquiry,
having no bearing on whether or nct the law existed as such. Thus
the natural law school has had no difficulty in accepting international law. Indeed, natural law is considered to have made possible the rise of international law as an organized field or discipline,
beginning with Grotius in the seventeenth century.9
Although the positivist position has been expressed in various
ways, the essence of the concept is that law can be distinguished
from other types of norms of human conduct by virtue of having
some kind of a human sovereign agency as its source and being
enforced by the sovereign through more or less explicit and identifiable sanctions. Anything lacking these ingredients must be some
phenomenon other than law. With such an attitude, the positivists
were naturally reluctant to accept international law as a member of
the fraternity in good standing. Austin, one of the most noted progenitors of the contemporary positivist school, flatly rejected the
proposition that international law is law.
Subsequent positivists have sought to include international law
within their system. It seemed like an increasing source of embarrassment to them if they were to reject as law something which
the world community solemnly considered to be law and asserted
essential rights under it. A dualistic theory of law was evolved,
8. Jhering states as follows: "A legal proprosition without legal compulsion behind it
is a contradiction in itself; a fire that bums not, a light that shines not." Quoted in Pound,
OUTLINE OF JUmSPRUDENCE 75 (5th ed. 1943).
9. Von Schuschnigg, INTERNATIONAL LAW 6 (1959).

1961]

SOME INTERNATIONAL LAW CONCEPTS

notably by Kelsen, to accommodate international law within the
positivist system. It was considered that, according to the subjects
upon which it operated, law might have different types of supreme
sources, and hence different types of sanctions to compel obedience. 10 Under this theory the supreme source of international law
becomes the consensus of the international community, as a substitute for the authority of the state; and the enforcing sanctions become the pressure and censure of the international community
against any violator, and its tolerance of war being waged by the
party offended against the violator, the offended state then occupying a position analogous to the state's policeman. The natural law
position, of course, is monistic throughout, and would find repugnant any such dualism or pluralism." l And a positivist who takes a
monistic view that law is exemplified by the express legal systems
of national states can scarcely accept international law within his
legal system.
II
The international community of sovereign states by definition
lacks any superior agency for the formulation and enforcement of
law, unlike municipal law. The specific norms of international law
must then derive from agreement among the states themselves, the
subjects of the law. It is the duty of every state to honor such
agreements, as is expressed by the maxim pacta sunt servanda. This
maxim represents at least one of the most significant foundations of
international law. Indeed, some distinguished international jurists
12
consider this principle to be the neucleus from which it depends.
This system of agreement between states takes two basic forms.
One is the general consensus of the international community as to
the norms that will be binding on them. The other consists of the
express and more formal treaties whereby states bind themselves in
certain explicit ways to each other.'
In a sense it may be argued that only the general consensus is
really the law, and the treaties are analogous to contracts between
individuals under a system of municipal law. If a question is raised
as to whether a contract has been broken, one does notlook to the
contract itself for principles of law relative to contracts, but rather
to the law of contracts that has been provided by the state. Similar10. See Kelsen, The Pure Theory of Law, 55 Harv. L. R. 44, 66 (1941).
11. For a discussion of monistic and dualistic theories, see 1 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW (Lauterpacht) 37 (8th ed. 1958).
12. Anzilotti, 1 Conso Di DIRITTO INTERNATJONALE 41 (3d ed. 1928); quoted in
translation in Hudson, CASES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 4 (3d ed. 1951).
13. Podesta Costa, 1 DERECuO INTERNACIONAL PUBLICo 28 (3d ed. 1955).
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ly it may be argued that if violation of a treaty has been alleged,
one determines the issue by reference to general principles of international law (beginning, presumably, with pacta sunt servanda),
rather than to the treaty itself. Yet, if international law is formulated by the sovereign states of the international community themselves, one may say that the law binding on a state conists of all the
rules to which the state has agreed, irrespective of the particular
form of such rules. In this view, the analogy between treaties and
private contracts is imperfect. We don't conceive of private individuals as devising special "laws" for themselves in contracts, since
law-giving is the exclusive prerogative of the state. But there is no
such reluctance to conceive of the state as making law for itself in
conjunction with other states as parties to treaties.
Moreover, some treaties are legislative in nature, and are designed to set up a binding code of conduct on the parties within the
area covered by such treaties. These are characteristically multipartite treaties designed to regularize a relatively broad field of
international conduct. Some of the better known examples of
treaties of this type are the international postal conventions and the
Hague and Geneva conventions relating to the rules for the conduct
of war.. If a. preponderance of the states of the world subscribe to
such treaties, and they are observed over a substantial period of
time, they may be said to have become part of general international
law. Such treaties may represent a codification of what had already
been established as part of international law through the consensus
of states as emplified by their long-continued practice. Such codification serves the purpose of clarifying ambiguous or debatable
points of general law. For example, in 1958 in Geneva there was an
attempt to arrive at a general agreement relating to the vexing
matter of law of the marginal seas and their limits. No significant
agreement among the states present was reached, but continuing
attempts are being made along such lines.
It is a basic proposition that a state is not bound by any treaty
to which it is not a party. However, if one of these legislative
treaties should be of such nature as to gain wide acceptance, it appears that the entire community of states would be carried along in
its wake. At least this would tend to be particularly true as to
treaties that primarily codify existing international law.
The consensus outside of treaties that forms the basis of international law is revealed chiefly through the customs and practices
of states in their dealings with each other, the opinions and writings
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of respected authorities in international law, and judicial holdings,
particularly of international tribunals. This gives rise to divergences
of opinion between states as to the content of some of the rules of
international law, as states may vary in practice as to what they
have regarded as legal, or they may differ as to which of two conflicting authorities is correct. Thus, international law as defined by
one state may differ from international law as defined by another
state.1" But, although such divergences may lead to the most
serious practical consequences, they are not sufficient to destroy the
edifice of international law itself.
It must be borne in mind that the international law system as we
know it is a European phenomenon, and an outgrowth of the Roman-Christian culture of Europe. During and prior to the early
formulative years of our present international law, lawyers and
writers looked to the Roman "jus gentium" in dealing with problems between states. The jus gentium ("law of peoples") was the
system of law the Romans had used for the non-Roman subjects of
their Empire. The jus gentium as opposed to the "jus civile" applicable to the Roman homeland was considered to be a natural precedent for the law to be applied between the peoples of politically
fragmented Europe after the disappearance of the Roman Emipre.
At least with regard to political concepts (as distinguished from
power) Europe has long since dominated the' world, and it continues vigorously consolidating its supremacy. So, a system of law
that evolved for the regulaton of relations between European states
is now essentially world-wide, as a result of Europe's success in providing for the organization of the entire world. All states, however
non-European in culture or society they may be, now participate in
this consensus stemming from European origins.
III
Courts are a central feature in any system of municipal law. They
usually are the highest agency directing the imposition of sanctions
for the enforcement of law. Also, they may be viewed as one of the
agencies of the sovereignty which formulates or makes internal law.
Within the international law system, courts have a much less exalted place. Herein lies another important difference between international and municipal law, though this distinction is conceptually more superficial than those relating to sanctions and the subjects of law.
14.
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One of the most important political and legal principles is that of
the immunity of any sovereign state from the jurisdiction of any
court. The state may, and of course often does, waive its immunity
and consent to a court's taking jurisdiction over it. This is true both
as to the state's domestic courts and as to international courts. And
a state may legally bind itself in advance to submit to a court's jurisdiction over it for cases that may arise in the future, through internal
laws waiving immunity before the domestic courts, or through international agreements regarding the jurisdiction over it of international courts. This lack of compulsory jurisdiction is a necessary
result of the concept of the sovereignty of states. For, if courts are
an agency of the sovereign state that by definition knows no superior it is a logical impossibility that there should be courts capable
of commanding the state, unless the state voluntarily delegates such
power to it.
Nevertheless, because states have chosen as a matter of policy to
submit some of their international differences to international courts
for adjudication, such courts have assumed greater significance in
international law. Such courts are a relatively recent innovation.
There is presently the International Court of Justice, which was
created by the United Nations Charter.1" This is a direct successor
to and a continuation of the former Permanent Court of International Justice, which functioned under the League of Nations. Prior
to that time there were no courts, in the narrower sense, of general
international scope. There has existed since 1899 the Permanent
Court of Arbitration at The Hague. But this was not a "court" in
the usual or technical sense, but rather a permanent panel of arbitrators from which, as cases arose, panels would be chosen to form
tribunals of arbitration.
While arbitration is a form of judicial procedure, it is distinct from
court procedures. The practice of recourse to judicial procedures
for the settlement of international disputes developed chiefly in the
nineteenth century before arbitral tribunals. 6 One method whereby arbitration might arise would be where two states would agree,
after a dispute had arisen between them, to submit the matter to a
board of arbitration, composed in a manner acceptable to both
states. The states would bind themselves in advance to accept and
obey the decision of the tribunal. When the case was concluded,
the tribunal would cease to exist, nor would any later disputes be15. The U. N. Charter establishes the Court (Chapter XIV, Articles 92-96), but the
Statute of the International Court of Justice is a distinct document from the Charter.
16. The first modern arbitration treaty is usually considered to be the Jay Treaty of
1794 between United States and Great Britain. 1 TrEATIES AND CONVENTIONS 590.
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tween the parties be similarly arbitrated except as they might agree
to such procedures as each individual dispute arose. However,
states could commit themselves to permanent or indefinite treaties
of arbitration, wherein they would agree that certain described
types of disputes would be referred to arbitration, with provisions
for the selection of tribunals as need should arise. The Hague Conference of 1899 provided for arbitration commitments of the latter
kind. However, it has remained a matter of state policy and discretion as to whether it will bind itself to submit to arbitration, and
international law has never compelled a state to do so. The use of
arbitration has been particularly widespread in the field of private
international claims, especially private war claims. 1 7 Arbitral procedures, however, have fallen largely into disuetude during the
last three decades.
The arbitral tribunals are by nature completely the creatures of
the states agreeing to their composition. By agreement the states
may limit the subject-matter into which the tribunal may inquire,
and may determine the specific procedural rules to be followed. A
court, by contrast, is a creature of the law, rather than of the
parties; the extent of the court's inquiry is determined by the law
the court finds applicable to the case before it, and its rules of procedure are determined by the court itself or by the laws instituting
the court, and the parties must conform to them. And, although a
court functions only as cases are brought to it for decision, it is conceived as a permanent institution, rather than being assembled on
an ad hoc basis for specific cases or groups of cases. as is characteristic of international arbitral tribunals. Once the litigant states are
before an international court, customary general judicial concepts
attach - though not, of course, the special judicial concepts of any
one state as such.
No hierarchy of courts has ever developed in international law.
The International Court of Justice is the only court in its system,
and it exercises only original jurisdiction. There are no courts below it for which it might discharge an appellate function, nor is
there any judicial appeal from its decisions. If the volume of litigation were to warrant, there is no inherent reason why a system of
inferior courts could not be developed. However, relatively few
cases are brought before the International Court of Justice, as is indicated by the fact that it has been asked to adjudicate only some
17. Another landmark in the development of arbitration was the Treaty of Washington
of 1871 between United States and Great Britain for the disposal of .the "Alabama" claims
growing out of the American Civil War. 1 TREATIES AND CONVENTIONS 700.
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thirty cases since its inception in 1946. This court, including its
League of Nations predecessor, is not entirely unique, as a few
other international courts have existed, but have been on a specialized or regional basis, such as the Central American Court of Justice. So for the present, at least, the International Court of Justice
for most practical purposes may be considered as the unique totality
of the international court system, as distinct from the system of
arbitration.
The average private individual usually seeks relief in a court of
law only for his weightiest problems, involving his most important
personal affairs or substantial amounts of money. Lesser matters
he usually prefers to resolve in less ponderous ways, even though he
might have a good cause of action against his adversary. Just the
reverse has tended to be true with regard to the matters states lay
before the International Court. They have generally been willing to
bring only relatively minor matters to court, and have preferred to
retain under their complete control the handling of major disputes
that they deem to involve their vital national interests. Indeed, it
has been argued by distinguished international lawyers that only
minor international disputes are properly susceptible of judicial
treatment. 8 And it remains debatable whether a state could legally
assign to a court the power to make a final determination as to matters affecting a state's vital interests, including perhaps even its integrity and existence, and thus divest itself of its prime function and
duty of providing for the common good.
What happens when an international court pronounces judgment
against a respondent state? That state then becomes obligated to
honor that judgment. What if that state refuses to do so? It then
becomes exposed to such sanctions as its adversary and other members of the international community may choose to apply against it,
with war being the ultimate sanction. The individual defendant
who has lost his litigation in a municipal law system cannot hope to
resist successfully the enforcement of a final judgment against him.
True, he may have some success, at least temporarily, as a fugitive
from the law in various ways. But he cannot defy the judgment, as
his individual power is as nothing compared with the power of society as organized through the state. This is not true as to the
comparison of our state litigant in an international court vis-a-vis
the world community, particularly if such state be a major power.
The international court has no sheriff or marshall whom it can order
18.
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to enforce its judgments. At best, it could only appeal to other
states to bring pressure or force to bear on the recalcitrant defendant, and these other states would respond to such an appeal primarily as they considered their national interests dictated. Here
again is raised the question of sanctions under international law,
and an illustration of how they contrast with the routine and presumed sanctions underlying municipal law.
Mention may be appended here as to the relationship of domestic
courts to international law. In the sense that is being discussed
here, they do not participate in international life. However, principles of international law may be involved in cases brought before
them by private litigants, and they accordingly will render decisions
making pronouncements regarding international law.'
Such decisions participate in the growth and development of international
law, and have persuasive influence on it, in much the same way as
the opinion of an influential writer or authority in that field.
IV
Law may be viewed as a system of ordering relationships between a plurality of entities. It therefore presumes some manner or
organization of those entities. In discussing international law the
entities involved are states. So if international law is indeed law
(some positivists to the the contrary notwithstanding), then presumably some form of international organization evolved as soon
as human society had created two states that were aware of each
20
other's existence.
Little in the way of formalized international relationships were
required under the political conditions of the ancient world. The
historical record indicates that most of such problems as existed
were resolved when one orieI.tal empire conquered and annexed
another. However ,the Greek city-states formed various leagues and
alliances, mostly for purposes of military security against one of
their more ambitious colleagues or against Persia.2 1 After the Roman
Empire had established its broad hegemony, about the only state
with which it had to deal (apart from the chaotic barbarians of
northern Europe) was Parthia, the then contemporary version of
Persia (now Iran).
Yet Rome had purported to rule the entire civilized world. After
19. E.g., Molina v. Comision Reguladora del Mercado de Henequen, 91 N.J.L. 382,
103 A. 397 (1918), where a New Jersey court was called upon to discuss whether the
Mexican state of Yucatan had international personality.
20. Nussbaum, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS 5 (1954).
21. Id. at 10.
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the fall of Rome, it continued to provide a tradition or ideal of
sovereign unity that influenced international organization throughout the Middle Ages and into modern times, and perhaps is part of
the psychological background of our present United Nations. The
concept of one "emperor", as a successor of the Roman caesars continued throughout medieval political thought in Europe as an ideal
for the organization of the political community of Europe. Although this ideal never achieved any significant success as a matter
of practical politics, it was not fully laid to rest in that form until
1806, with the renunciation by the last Holy Roman emperor of that
imperial title in favor of the more realistic title of emperor of
Austria.
Long before that date, however, the one emperor ideal had ceased
to be effective. Early modern times generally lacked any recognition of even a theoretical supra-national authority, and formal international organization consisted largely of cynical military alliances.
This may seem to be largely anarchical, but so long as the several
states recognized and observed certain proper ways of conducting
their relations with one another, there was at least something which
could be called a "community of states" as the lowest and loosest
level of international organization.22
The nineteenth century witnessed the growth of somewhat more
formalized international organization..2 3 Out of the Congress of
Vienna in 1815, wherein virtually all the states of Europe participated in resettling Europe after the Napoleonic upheavals, came the
Holy Alliance of the major powers. The Holy Alliance held periodic meetings for a while, took a few active steps such as suppressing a rebellion in Spain in the 1820's, and then more or less lapsed.
In Paris in 1856 there was again a significant assembly of the states
of Europe taking some united action. Another such assemblage
occurred in Berlin in 1878, where the ideal of international organization was expressed as the "Concert of Europe". However superficial these nineteenth century arrangements may now seem, they
were an appreciable advance in organizational strength over the
mere military alliances that were typical of the eighteenth century.
Finally, the contemporary concepts of international organization
were formulated in the League of Nations and its successor, the
United Nations. In perspective, they should not be viewed as new
or original concepts, or as the origins of international organization.
22. See Fenwick, INTERNATIONAL LAW 101 (3d ed. 1948).
23. See Butler and Maccoby, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL
(1928).
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Rather, they should be viewed as the intensification of organization,
having evolved along a continuum of organization beginning with
the community of states of early modern times, which probably
represents a historical nadir of international organization. Probably
the most unique aspect of the United Nations is its virtual univerprevented
sality, since primitiveness of communications physically
4
any earlier system from achieving such extent.
The United Nations does not involve a change in fundamental
concepts of international law, which rest ultimately on agreements
between sovereign states,'25 with some overriding strictures that
need not presently concern us. It is true that membership in the
United Nations imposes on a state limitations and obligations of
action that do not exist under general principles of international
law. However, each member state has voluntarily accepted these
obligations and limitations, and hence the whole structure rests on
agreement among states in the traditional way. The general rules
as to the binding affects of international agreements appear to apply to the provisions of the United Nation's Charter. States invoke
considerations of their paramount national interests in determining
the extent to which they consider themselves bound by Charter
provisions or mandates of United Nations organs. All this is quite
at variance with any notion that the United Nations is any form of
super-state, or that the members have surrendered to it essential
characteristics of sovereignty.
Similarly as to sanctions the traditional international law system
continues under the regime of the United Nations. It is true that
the United Nations provides a more formal and ready enforcement
machinery for its decisions than would otherwise exist at international law. Yet, it still has against a recalcitrant state nothing comparable to the force of the sheriff or police against the private individual being subjected to enforcement of domestic law. Sanctions under the United Nations still depend on the volition of the
members,2 6 who generally have participated in these sanctions in
accordance with the dictates of their national intrest rather than out
of a pure sense of duty such as is expected of a policeman.
These remarks would not preclude the possibility of the United
Nations ultimately proving to be a decisive institution working
fundamental changes in international law. The fact of its substan24.

"The international community

today thus has a global membership."

USE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 22 (1959).
25. Jessup, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS 124 (1948).
26. Kelsen, THE-LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS 934 (1951).
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tially universal membership coupled with its organizational coherence certainly offer possibilities for it to make fundamental changes
in international law. And the historical ideal and aspiration toward
the unity of peoples, in various guises, may give impetus to increased scope and power for the United Nations. But whether such
things are to be or should be remain for future decision. For the
present the available evidence recommends a conservative and
limited view of the United Nations as being an institution existing
within the framework of traditional international law and organization.
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